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Existing research suggests that bureaucrats’ optimal behavior is to maximize 
their agency’s budgets, but does not account for information imperfections nor explore 
the tactics bureaucrats employ in maximizing their budgets. Drawing on the rational 
expectations literature, we propose a new theoretical model that describes the behaviors 
of politicians who, using imperfect information, judge an agency’s performance, and 
bureaucrats who, by varying the agency’s transparency, alter the degree of information 
imperfection and so influence the politicians’ abilities to judge the agency’s performance. 
We then fit data from the government’s Performance Accountability Reports and the 
Scorecard data set to our model and obtain empirical results that are consistent with 
what our theoretical model predicts. 
  
1. Agency Performance and the Growth of Government 
The federal government’s share of the US economy rose from 9% in 1927 to 
almost 30% in 2007, spawning numerous studies into the natures and causes of 
government growth. Niskanen (1971) introduces the idea of the self-interested bureaucrat 
who, using private information not shared by politicians, secures an inefficiently large 
budget. While Niskanen’s conclusions have been debated extensively in the literature, 
perhaps due to a lack of data, bureaucrats’ information advantages have been less so.  
The goal of this analysis is to study the effect of information advantage on budget 
size by using newly available data on bureaucratic transparency as an inverse proxy for 
information advantage. By modeling transparency as a variable the bureaucrat can affect, 
this research incorporates imperfect information into the bureaucrat’s budget-maximizing 
behavioral model. The resulting model is examined to gain insights into the bureaucrat’s 
optimal behavior. Lastly, we use data on transparency and information relevance to test 
for the results that our theoretical model predicts.  
Past researchers have attempted to explain the growth of government as a result of 
a complicated revenue structure that hides the full cost of government (Buchanan 1967; 
Goetz 1977; Pommerehne and Schneider, 1978), in terms of voter models (Downs 1957; 
Black 1958; Busch and Denzau 1977), and as a natural outcome of the institutions and 
procedures of the U.S. Congress (Ferejohn 1974; Fiorina and Noll 1978). Niskanen (1968, 
1971, 1975) formally modeled the bureaucrat’s behavior where the bureaucrat maximizes 
utility by maximizing his agency’s budgets. He finds that bureaucrats succeed in 
enlarging their budgets because bureaucrats possess private information not available to  
the politicians who set their budgets, and bureaucrats receive lump-sum budget 
appropriations rather than “per unit” appropriations. 
  Blais and Dion (1990) provide a summary of many criticisms of and 
modifications to Niskanan’s model. Kogan (1973) and Margolis (1975) criticize 
Niskanen’s model for its assumption that bureaucrats serve their own, rather than the 
public’s interest. Migue and Belanger (1974) suggest that, to the extent bureaucrats 
would seek to maximize budgets, they would be primarily interested in maximizing their 
discretionary budgets (total budget minus minimum cost) rather than their total budgets. 
Rogowski (1978) claims that Niskanen’s proposition of asymmetric information and the 
time required to overcome bureaucrats’ expansionary tendencies holds only in the context 
of the American political system. Mackay and Weaver (1983, 1979) show that, 
depending on who has the power to decide on the public services mix and expenditure 
level, the conclusion of an inevitably growing budget does not always hold. While 
admitting that bureaucrats retain some informational advantages, Miller and Moe (1983) 
claim that there are numerous limits to those advantages, that politicians have their own 
advantages in the bargaining game, and that Niskanen exaggerates bureaucrats’ 
bargaining power. Dunleavy (1985) argues that if Niskanen’s logic is extended, it would 
suggest an end result of gigantic bureaucracies, which are rare for liberal democracies. 
Bendor et al. (1985) and Breton and Wintrobe (1975) claim that politicians will establish 
monitoring systems to compensate for bureaucrats’ private information. 
In support of Niskanen’s general results, Bendor, Taylor and Gaalen (1985) 
construct a model in which bureaucrats face monitoring but at an unknown level. Their 
model shows that bureaucratic output moves closer to the efficient point when  
bureaucrats are risk-averse but that, despite this improvement, budgets remain supra-
optimal. Hood, Dunsire and Thomson (1988) and Dillman (1986) show that determined 
governments can decrease the size of bureaucracy in certain areas, but only at high 
political cost. Banks (1990) employs game theoretic analysis to show that agenda-setting 
bureaus can utilize their monopoly power to obtain budgets that are better than or equal 
to the “reversion level” (the budget that would be approved if the bureau’s proposal were 
defeated). He shows that bureaus, utilizing informational advantages, can ensure growing 
or at least flat budgets. De Alessi (1969, 1974), Ahlbrandt (1973), Wagner and Weber 
(1975), Orzechowski (1977), Deacon (1979), and Bennett and Johnson (1979) apply data 
to Niskanen’s original model and find overly large budgets and employment across 
government bureaus. De Alessi (1969) shows that the government tends to use lower 
discount rates than private firms, leading to overestimation of the benefits of investments, 
but exhibits no bias in cost estimates resulting in overinvestment in the public sector. 
Using data from metropolitan areas, Wagner and Weber (1975) find that the provision of 
public services is more appropriately classified as a monopoly, supporting Niskanen’s 
proposition that bureaus act as the single supplier of their respective services. Deacon 
(1979) and Ahlbrandt (1973) identify large expenditure differences between purchasing 
and providing public services by local governments, which suggest bureaucratic 
overproduction.  
  Despite criticisms as to Niskanen’s assumptions, a significant quantity of research 
subsequent to Niskanen (1975) has not overturned his basic conclusions. However, there 
have been relatively fewer studies on how performance, transparency and imperfect  
information affect the results. This paper will attempt to shed more light on these 
questions. 
 
2. The Behavioral Model  
  According to bureaucracy theory, a bureau’s budget equals the total social benefit 
provided by its services, or as a function of the consumer preferences for the service, the 
quality of the service, and the quantity provided.  
   Budget Social Benefit ( , , ) f abQ = =      (1.1) 
Q = quantity of services performed 
b = quality of performance (i.e., quality of the delivered service)  
a = intrinsic value of the service 
An implicit assumption of this model is that politicians could perfectly measure 
social benefit. Even if politicians could forecast the quantity of public service and 
consumer preferences for the public service, it is not plausible that politicians would be 
able to forecast perfectly the quality of the service. Following Tabellini and Alesina 
(1990), we build a behavioral model describing the interaction of a bureaucrat’s choice to 
allocate energy to improving an agency’s performance versus communicating (or 
obfuscating) information about the agency’s performance, and a politician’s decision to 
fund the agency in the presence of uncertainty as to the agency’s actual performance. 
Let the j
th agency have an actual performance, 
j b , that will be realized at time t + 
1. At time t, the i
th politician forms an expectation,  ˆ j
i b , of the agency’s performance. The 
difference between the expected and actual performances is a forecast error comprised of 
two components. The first component is a natural variation resulting from unforecastable  
events affecting a bureau’s performance. The second is an idiosyncratic error due to the 
politician’s lack of information and/or inability to process available information correctly. 
We distinguish between the two error components because the politician should be held 
accountable for the second but not for the first. 
Following the framework described in Davies and Lahiri (1995, 1999) and Davies 
(2006) for decomposing forecast errors, let  ˆ j b  be the (unobserved) performance agency j 
would have achieved in the absence of any unforecastable events. Since the agency’s 
actual performance is 
j b , we have  
  ˆ j jj bbε = +    (1.2) 
where ε is the natural variation associated with agency j. Let the difference between 
politician i’s expectation of agency j’s performance,  ˆ j
i b , and the performance agency j 
would have attained in the absence of unforecastable events be the idiosyncratic 
observational error,  i ϕ , such that 
  ˆˆ jj
ii bbϕ = +    (1.3)  
This observational error is a combination of politician i’s imperfect information and 
individual bias. If all politicians perfectly processed all available information, the 
politicians would, by definition, have the same (and unbiased) expectation as to the 
agency’s performance (i.e.,  0    i i ϕ =∀ ). Davies and Lahiri (1995, 1999) and Davies 
(2006) show that even if forecasters (in this case, politicians estimating performances) 
perfectly processed all available information, because of unforcastable events, the 
expected performances may deviate from the actual performances.
1 The performance 
                                                 
1 For more information on forecasting errors structure see Palm and Zellner (1991).   
politician i expects the agency to attain is the agency’s actual performance adjusted for 
politician i’s bias and for unforecastable events. Combining (1.2) and (1.3), we have 
  ˆ j jj
ii bbϕ ε = +−   (1.4)  
Let Congress’ aggregate perception of the performance of the j
th agency,  ˆ j b , be the 










= ∑    (1.5) 
Congress’ perception of the agency’s performance deviates from the agency’s actual 
performance as (where there are N members of Congress and their individual 












=+ − =+ ∑    (1.6) 
where, from the Central Limit Theorem,  ( )
2 ~0 , j
j N
γ γσ . Because Congress expects 
performance  ˆ j b , but knows the actual performance will deviate from the expectation, 
Congress faces a lottery wherein the expected outcome is  ˆ j b  and the expected payoff of 
the lottery is  () ,,
j f ab Q (Davies and Cline 2005, Varian 1992). Varian (1992) shows 
that a second order Taylor-expansion is adequate for approximating the expected payoff 
of a lottery. We have: 
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b f  is the n
th derivative of f with respect to 
j b .  
Let an agency be more transparent as the cost of constructing an accurate 
estimate of the agency’s performance falls. More transparent agencies lend themselves to 
less costly analyses and so, ceteris paribus, we can expect politicians’ expectations of the 
performances to be subject to less observational error. Letting 
j T  be the measure of 
agency j’s transparency, we have:  








  A peculiar feature of agency performance reporting is the lack of established 
standardized performance measures. Individual agencies are permitted to choose their 
own performance metrics and, consequently, have the ability to report metrics that are, in 
fact, irrelevant. Let the relevance of agency j’s self-reported performance measure, 
j r , 
reflect the degree to which that performance measure truly reflects the agency’s 
performance. To recap, we have defined 
j b  to be agency j’s actual performance, and  ˆ j
i b  
to be politician i’s expectation of agency j’s performance. Now, let 
j b %  be agency j’s self-
reported performance, and  ˆ
j
i r  be politician i’s perceived relevance of agency j’s self-
reported performance. An individual politician’s perception of relevance,  ˆ
j
i r , varies 
around the average relevance perceived by all politicians,  ˆ




ii rr τ = +    (1.9) 
  It is reasonable to suppose that, ceteris paribus, the better a politician’s estimate of 
an agency’s performance, the greater the relevance the politician will ascribe to the 
agency’s self-reported performance measures (i.e., a politician’s positive estimate of an  
agency’s performance will encourage a “halo effect” by which the politician will tend to 
perceive the agency’s self-reported performance measures to have greater relevance). 
Conversely, the better an agency’s self-reported performance, ceteris paribus, the less 
relevance the politician will ascribe to the agency’s performance measures (i.e., ceteris 
paribus, a politician is more likely to suspect that an agency that self-reports excellent 
performance is attempting to make itself look better by reporting measures that are less 
relevant). Following this argument, let us assume a linear relation such that, for some 
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Solving (1.11) for  ˆ j b  and combining with (1.7) yields the expected social benefit of the 
agency: 
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  It is reasonable to assume that an increase in the agency’s performance will 
eventually be followed by an increase the agency’s budget.
3 Thus (assuming for 
simplicity that the effect of performance on budget is instantaneous): 











                                                 
2 For ease of discussion, we assume that the performance measures are scaled such that performance, and 
therefore relevance, is strictly positive. 
3 This assumption if supported by the empirical results of Gilmour and Lewis (2006).  
The relationship between the budget and the level of transparency is less intuitive. 
Derivating (1.12) with respect to T yields  


















%  (1.14) 
  From (1.8), the first-order derivative on the right hand side is negative. We claim 
that it is reasonable to model the second-order derivative as a third-order polynomial such 
that the sign of 
(2)
j b f  changes at some “benchmark” level of performance, 
* b . For 
example, suppose that an agency accomplished 70% of its stated goals. Whether 
Congress judges this to constitute good performance or bad performance requires that 
Congress compares the performance with the benchmark. Assuming declining marginal 
returns, Congress is likely to regard a fixed change in performance as being less 
meaningful for agencies that are performing far above or far below the benchmark. That 
Congress would evaluate performance against a benchmark is consistent with Banks 
(1990), and Kouzmin, Loffler, Klages, and Korac-Kakabadse (1999). 
Expected performance above the benchmark level adds to the positive image and 
(eventually) the budget of an agency, while expected performance under the benchmark 
hurts the agency’s budget. From the agency’s perspective, forecasted performance 
relative to the benchmark is an economic good, while forecasted underperformance is an 
economic bad. Consistent with economic theory, diminishing marginal returns apply in 
both cases, which suggests that the function has an inflection point at the benchmark 
level of performance. We assume that social benefit as a function of performance follows 




Figure 1. Relationship of Social Benefit to Agency Performance 
 
















































  From (1.16) we see that agencies performing above the benchmark level prefer 
more transparency because increased transparency increases the payoff Congress expects 
from the agency. Similarly, agencies performing below the benchmark level prefer less 
transparency. 
Suppose the bureaucrat can allocate a fixed quantity of effort either to altering an 
agency’s performance or to altering the agency’s transparency. Assuming fixed marginal 
costs to additional performance and additional effort the bureaucrat maximizes (1.12) 
subject to the constraint 
  () ( ) Fixed effort Performance effort Transparency effort αβ =+  (1.17)  
It is reasonable to assume that there is some “benchmark” level of transparency such that 
it is costly to increase transparency above the benchmark (i.e., the effort of reporting 
information is costly) but also costly to decrease transparency below the benchmark (i.e., 
the effort of hiding information is costly). Let us assume, for simplicity, that the 
























Because the first derivative of (1.7) is discontinuous at 
* ˆ j bb = , there are two 
optimization points: one for high performing agencies (i.e., 
* ˆ j bb > ) and one for low 
performing agencies (i.e., 






















where, due to (1.18), the first equation in (1.19) is the first order condition for agencies 
performing above the benchmark performance and the second is the first order condition 
for agencies performing below the benchmark performance.
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4 For simplicity, we assume that high-performing agencies always perform above the benchmark while 
low-performing agencies always performer below the benchmark.  
If the marginal cost of improving performance, α , increases relative to the marginal cost 
of increasing transparency, β , then the bureaucrat responds by substituting increased 
transparency for performance. 















When the marginal cost of improving performance increases relative to the cost of 
decreasing transparency, the bureaucrat responds by substituting reduced transparency for 
performance. 
  Three conclusions result from our model: (1) from the agency’s perspective, 
transparency is a substitute for performance; (2) reduced transparency is a good for 
agencies operating below the performance benchmark, while (3) increased transparency 
is a good for those operating above the benchmark. An important implication is that 
changes in oversight rules that affect the bureaucracy’s marginal costs also affect the 
performance delivered by each agency. 
 
3. The Data 
 
In this section, we test the hypothesis that higher performing agencies prefer more 
transparency using data on discretionary budgets, reported performance, relevance, and 
transparency for twenty-two of the twenty-four largest federal agencies over the period 
2002 through 2007.
5 Reported performances come from the Performance and 
                                                 
5 The years were chosen based on the availability of reported performance data. The combined 
discretionary expenditures of the twenty-two agencies account for over 97% of non-military discretionary 
Federal Government spending for each year covered in this study. The two excluded agencies are the  
Accountability Reports (PAR). According to the Government Performance and Results 
Act of 1993, each federal agency is required to submit annually a PAR along with its 
proposed budget. The PAR is a self-evaluation in which the agency classifies 
performance as “Not Met,” “Met,” or “Exceeded” for each of several self-identified goals. 
Agency specific discretionary budget data come from the annual publications of the 
Budget of the United States. 
Transparency and relevance indices are constructed from data obtained from 
Scorecard, an annual publication of the Mercatus Center at George Mason University (for 
other studies using the Scorecard data set, see Parker (2003) and Chun and Rainey 
(2005)). Scorecard’s purpose is to attempt to measure how well agencies disclose their 
performances – independent of the agencies’ functions or their results. Scorecard 
provides three measures for transparency (each graded on a scale of 1 = inadequate to 5 = 
outstanding): How easy is it to read/understand the PAR?, Is the cited performance data 
reliable, credible, and verifiable?, and Was there trend and baseline data included in the 
PAR for context?
6 Our transparency index is the average of the three measures. Scorecard 
provides one measure for relevance (graded on a scale of 1 to 5): Are the performance 
measures valid indicators of the agency’s impact on its outcome goal? This measure is 
our relevance index. 
As control variables, we also include real GDP growth (which also serves as a 
proxy for the growth in Q) and political bias dummy variables. Previous literature 
suggests two ways of capturing the political bias effect. One is to separate agencies based 
                                                                                                                                                 
Department of Defense (because transparency is a more complicated matter) and the Department of Labor 
(due to missing performance data). 
6 Scorecard has a fourth transparency criterion: How easily is the PAR obtained? As we are concerned with 
agency transparency as viewed by Congress, not the general public, and as Congress has ready access to all 
PARs, we exclude this criterion from our transparency index.  
on historical liberal or conservative leanings (Gilmour and Lewis, 2006). Another is to 
define agencies as “in favor” if their budgets were growing faster than average up until a 
political power change. We use both measures. Definitions for the variables appearing in 
our model are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Variable Definitions 
Variable Description 
jt F 
Growth rate, from year t-1 to year t, of agency j’s real discretionary 
budget (nominal budget deflated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ 
GDP deflator index). This is  ( ) ,,
j f ab Q in (1.1). 
jt B   Agency j’s self-reported performance index in year t. This is 
j b %  at time 
t. 
jt R   Scorecard’s relevance index for agency j in year t. This is  ˆ
j r  at time t. 
jt T  Scorecard’s transparency index for agency j in year t. This is 
j T  at time 
t. 
t G  Growth rate of real GDP from year t-1 to year t. 
jt L  1 if Gilmour and Lewis (2006) identify agency j as a “Democratic 
leaning” agency in year t; 0 otherwise. 
jt V 
1 if agency j’s budget grew faster than the average for all agencies from 
year t-1 to year t; 0 otherwise. This variable is a proxy for whether or 
not the agency is “in favor” politically at time t.  
 
4. The Econometric Model  
  In this section, we apply the data to the theoretical model to test the hypothesis 
that transparency is desired by high performing agencies but not by the low performing 
ones. Combining (1.12) and (1.14) yields  























%  (1.22) 
The first term on the right hand side suggests that the agency’s actual (and unobserved) 
performance, 
j b , should be measured as BjtRjt. As a proxy measure for Q, we use the  
growth in real GDP. We also assume that the intrinsic value of the agencies services, a, is 
constant over the data set. By (1.13), we expect the coefficient for BjtRjt to be positive. 
From (1.16), we expect the coefficient for Tjt to change signs depending on whether the 
agency’s performance is above or below its benchmark performance. This suggests the 
regressor  ()
*
jt jt jt TB R b −  where the second term alters the sign of the coefficient 
associated with Tjt. Since  () var





 is negative, and given 
(1.16), we expect the coefficient for  ( )
*
jt jt jt TB R b −  to be negative. This suggests the 
regression model 
  ( )
*
01 2 3 jt t jt jt jt jt jt jt FG B R T B R b u ββ β β =+ + + −+ (1.23) 
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We do not know the value for the benchmark performance, but assuming it to be positive, 
treating it as a parameter, and expanding the right hand side of (1.23) we have 
  01 2 3 4 jt t jt jt jt jt jt jt jt FG B R T B R T u β ββ β β =+ + + + + (1.25) 
where 
*





:0 ,  :0
:0 ,  :0














  We estimate (1.25) using feasible GLS and accounting for possible 
heteroskedasticity in the error term across agencies and time. Given the stochastic  
component in (1.9), we use an instrumental variables procedure on Rjt with non-linear 
functions of Bjt as instruments. Our results appear in Table 1.  
Table 2. Results 
01 2 3 4 jt t jt jt jt jt jt jt jt FG B R T B R T u β ββ β β =+ + + + + 
Regressor Estimate  Standard  Error  p-value 
constant -0.084  0.049  0.094 
t G   -0.032 0.008 0.000 
jt B Rjt   0.058 0.017 0.001 
jtj tj t TBR  -0.017 0.006 0.005 
jt T   0.053 0.022 0.016 
R
2  0.23    
D.W. 1.79     
Feasible GLS, 22 agencies, 2003-2007, 81 observations. 
When we include (separately) the political favor measures,  jt L  and  jt V , we find 




Our empirical results are consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model. 
Estimates of  3 β  and  4 β  imply that the (average) benchmark performance for the agencies, 
* b ,  is 3.1. Of the twenty-two agencies, five performed at or above the benchmark at least 
once over the six years covered by the data set: Department of Agriculture (2004-2007), 
Department of Education (2007), Department of the Interior (2005-2006), Department of 
Justice (2005, 2007), Small Business Administration (2004), Department of State (2004-
2007), Department of Transportation (2004-2007), US Agency for International 
Development (2007), and Department of Veteran Affairs (2006). Agencies that never 
performed above the estimated average benchmark over the six year period are: 
Department of Commerce, Department of Energy, Environmental Protection Agency, 
General Services Administration, Department of Health and Human Services, 
                                                 
7 The coefficient estimates and standard errors for Ljt and Vjt are, respectively, -0.005 (0.006) and 0.008 
(0.006). The weakness of these results is consistent with Gilmour and Lewis’ (2006) findings.  
Department of Homeland Security, Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
NASA, National Science Foundation, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of 
Personnel Management, Social Security Administration, and Department of the Treasury. 
  We included real GDP growth as a proxy for the quantity of services performed 
by the agencies, Q. The negative coefficient associated with real GDP suggests that 
appropriated discretionary budgets decrease during economic expansions, which is in line 
with the principle of fiscal stabilization.
8 Lastly, it should be noted that the low R
2  is 
consistent with findings of previous researchers in which bureaucratic budgets have been 




  The purpose of this research is to present a new theoretical model that describes 
the behaviors of politicians who, using imperfect information, judge an agency’s 
performance, and bureaucrats who, by varying the agency’s transparency, alter the degree 
of information imperfection and so influence the politicians’ abilities to judge the 
agency’s performance. Employing recent advances in rational expectation modeling to 
construct a behavioral model, we then fit transparency and performance data to our model 
and obtain empirical results that are consistent with what our theoretical model predicts. 
We conclude that an agency’s transparency has a real effect on the size of its budget. 
According to our model, a high performing agency can increase its budget simply by 
increasing transparency – a lower cost, lower effort undertaking compared to increasing 
performance. The theoretical model also suggests that if increasing performance is not an 
                                                 
8 As suggested by reviewers, we tested several different GDP lags. All come out significant and negative.   
option (due to prohibitive marginal costs), bureaucrats would instead focus their efforts 
on altering transparency in order to increase their budgets. In the case of a lower-
performing agency, this would take the form of the bureaucrat spending resources in an 
attempt to make the agency less transparent. The empirical results suggest that the 
theoretical model’s sobering implication is not unfounded: that the political process 
rewards agencies not only for increased performance, but also for alterations in 
transparency. Because information imperfections (both unintentional and intentional) can 
obfuscate performance, agencies can end up being rewarded for actions that do not 
increase the social welfare. 
  The results suggest that changes in transparency can be taken as signals for 
performance. Assuming that the goal is to increase the size of an agency’s budget, 
agencies that endeavor to increase transparency likely perform above the benchmark 
level while those that endeavor to decrease transparency likely perform below the 
benchmark level. Also, as the marginal cost of increased transparency falls relative to the 
marginal cost of increased performance (for example, due to the ability to post 
information on the Internet at low cost), the model suggests that agencies that perform 
above the benchmark will have greater incentive to spend resources on increasing 
transparency rather than increasing performance, while below-benchmark agencies will 
have greater incentive to spend resources on increasing performance.  
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